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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Pakistan’s total debt has reached to 115 percent of GDP in 2001 [Pakistan 
(2001)]; per capita debt exceeded per capita GDP.  The outstanding stock of public 
debt was roughly 400 percent of government revenue in 1980 and it increased to 624 
percent by mid-2000 [Pakistan (2001)]. It is the only country in South Asia, 
classified as “severely indebted low-income country” by the World Bank (2001). 
Debt servicing is more problematic than debt. It has been 2.5 percent of GNP during 
seventies and increased to 3.5 percent of GNP during eighties. In 2001, debt 
servicing consumes more than seventy percent government revenue and leaves less 
than thirty percent for every thing else [The News (2001)]. This increase in debt and 
debt servicing has affected creditworthiness of the country and raised the concern 
about its future growth prospects. The deterioration in all the indicators, like debt-
export ratio, debt-GDP ratio, debt servicing to GDP ratio etc. raised the risk of 
default and increased vulnerability of the country to external and internal shocks. 
One possible way out is the rescheduling of debt to minimise total loss to creditor 
countries as well as subside the burden of debtor country. Pakistan’s debt has been 
rescheduled many times during the last thirty years.  
Rescheduling of debt has been the subject of substantial academic research.1 
International organisations and the lender countries may reschedule sovereign debt 
of countries for the following reasons: First, debt rescheduling may help to achieve 
global efficiency of resource use.  Second, enforcing repayment contract may not be 
in the interest of creditors. Finally, it may help to achieve political objectives of the 
creditor countries [see Eaton (1990)]. Country specific analysis of factors that 
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influence rescheduling of debt helps debtor country to opt for the policies to reduce 
the risk of default. In addition to minimising the risk of total loss, it may also help 
creditor countries in allocating limited resources among developing countries 
optimally and improve efficiency of resource use globally. However, the 
significance of various indicators, mentioned above, may vary across the countries. 
As mentioned by Moghadam, et al. (1991),  “There may be no debt crisis, but rather 
a series of regional (country specific) debt crisis with different determinants”.2   
Empirical examination of debt crisis includes two types of indicators, i.e., 
economic or financial ratios and political factors. Some studies use financial ratios 
only while others use both types of variables to predict prospects of debt 
rescheduling for a country or region. To date, no study has been done to explore the 
determinants of debt rescheduling in Pakistan. This study includes both types of 
indicators to assess whether financial ratios or political variables or both affect 
country’s ability/inability to meet the debt obligations and its prospects for 
rescheduling. 
Plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section, debt situation in Pakistan 
is discussed.  Section III describes debt rescheduling for Pakistan over last thirty 
years. Section IV describes methodology and specifies a model to determine the 
probability of debt rescheduling with respect to financial ratios and political factors. 
Section V contains results of model. Final section concludes the study.     
 
II.  THE DEBT SITUATION OF PAKISTAN 
Pakistan’s domestic and external debt has increased at an unprecedented rate 
in the 1990s. The result is that debt repayment imposed heavy burden on domestic 
budget and external account position. In 1954-55 debt was only USD3 one million 
and by 1971-72 this figure reached USD 3766 million. Since then Pakistan’s foreign 
aid inflow has been rising rapidly, per capita debt exceeded per capita GDP in 1997 
for the first time. The stock of external debt was USD 15.5 billion in 1990-91 and it 
reached to USD 38.5 billion by the end of December 2001 showing an increase of 
148 percent during the last ten years. This means more than one billion dollar was 
accumulated each year in the last decade of 20th century. In 2000-01, Pakistan’s 
total debt, 55 percent foreign and 45 percent domestic, is 115 percent of GDP 
[Pakistan (2001)]. 
The debt servicing is the most worrisome part of the growing debt, in 1971 
debt servicing (DS) as percentage of GNP was 2.6 percent. After first rescheduling 
this ratio declined to 2.3 percent in 1974-75. This ratio sharply increased after 1981  
 and reached to 4.3 percent in  1989-90  (see  Table 1).  But  declined  again  to  2.7  
 
2Italic Added. 
3USD = United States Dollars. 
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Table 1 
Financial and Political Indicators of Debt Rescheduling (Percentages)  
  Year NT/GD DS/GNP DS/XGS INT/EDT GE/GDP 
1971-72 70.00 2.6 34.30 4.45 23.82 
1974-75 74.50 2.3 18.89 6.30 26.48 
1979-80 60.27 2.5 19.61 7.39 25.86 
1980-85 37.31 2.6 23.79 4.42 27.48 
1989-90 47.40 4.3 26.99 2.62 29.17 
1994-95 21.00 3.7 20.21 9.27 25.37 
1999-00 –6.00 2.7 15.22 5.25 25.19 
2000-01 6(E) 2.7 13.97 6.88 23.69 
Notes: NT = Net Transfers; GD = Gross Disbursement. DS = Debt servicing; GNP = Gross National 
Product; XGS = Export Earnings; INT = International Reserves; EDT = Debt Outstanding; GE = 
Government Expenditure;  GDP = Gross Domestic Product , FEE = Foreign Exchange Earnings. 
 
percent during 1999-00 due to debt relief from Paris club and non-Paris club donors. 
Debt servicing as percentage of exports of goods and services fell during 1971-72 to 
1979-80 from 34.3 percent to 19.6 percent. But it increased during the eighties very 
sharply and reached to 26.99 percent in 1989-90. The observed increase in debt 
servicing may be a result of shift in type of aid disbursed to Pakistan i.e. shift 
towards provision of project assistance instead of quickly disbursed programme 
assistance and shift in composition of aid from grants to loans and credits repayable 
in foreign exchange.4 Due to a large debt servicing, there has been declining trend, 
in real terms, in net inflows to Pakistan. It was 70 percent of gross disbursement in 
1970-71 and dropped to 25 percent in 1972-73. But after substantial rescheduling 
this ratio increased to 46 percent in the same year [Pakistan (1973-74)]. It rises again 
to 74.5 percent in 1974–77. In the later period, debt accumulated at very high rate. 
Due to large increase in debt and shift in type of aid, debt servicing increase and 
heavy burden of debt servicing in fact resulted in resource out flow in 1996-97, –1 
percent of gross disbursements [Pakistan (2001)] and in 1999-2000 –6 percent of 
gross disbursement (see Table 2).  After rescheduling of debt in 1999-2000 it 
increases again to 6 percent.  
 
4It is not only the external debt that resulted in crisis, but also the domestic debt. This resulted in 
allocation for debt servicing in the federal budget for the current fiscal year 2001-02 is Rs 329.2 billion out of 
total revenue of Rs 453.8 billion, leaving only 27.36 percent of revenue for everything else The News, December 
17, 2001. 
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Table 2 
  Indebtedness Indicators for South Asian Countries, 1999 
Countries 
EDT/ 
XGS 
PVDS/ 
XGS 
EDT/ 
GNP 
PVDS/ 
GNP 
DS/ 
XGS 
INT/ 
XGS 
Bangladesh 236 148 39 24 11 3 
India 153 114 22 16 16 6 
Nepal 220 122 59 32 8 2 
Pakistan 312 226 55 40 26 10 
Sri Lanka 139 103 62 46 8 3 
South Asian Countries 156 122.78 26.5 20.15 13.1 5.4 
Source:  World Bank (2001).  
Note:  EDT = Debt Outstanding, XGS = Exports of Goods, PVDS = Present Value of Debt Services, DS= 
Debt Servicing, GNP = Gross National Product, INT = International Reserves.    
 
Comparison of indicators of indebtedness across the South Asian countries 
shows that Pakistan lies in the category of severely indebted countries (see Table 2). 
Country is severely indebted if present value of debt service (PVDS) to GNP 
exceeds 80 percent or present value of debt service to exports exceeds 220 percent 
[World Bank (2001)] (see Table 2). Table shows that present value of debt service to 
exports and present value of debt service to GNP are lower than the critical value for 
all other developing countries.5 Only Pakistan has present value of debt service to 
export greater than the critical value of 220 percent.  
Table 2 also shows that Pakistan’s total debt, as percentage of exports 
(EDT/XGS) is 312 percent highest in the region, Debt servicing (DS/XGS) is 26 
percent of exports, which includes interest payment of amount 10 percent of exports. 
All these statistics show that Pakistan is severely indebted country in the region.  
Public and external debt has been the major sources of imbalances in 
Pakistan. During the last decade, fiscal and current account deficit as percentage of 
GDP have been around 6.8 percent and 4.5 percent. This exposes Pakistan’s poor 
budgetary and current account situation. We need to generate more revenue and 
expand exports beyond the 8 billion to meet debt repayment requirements. Can we 
overcome this situation without taking long-term aid in the form of Extended 
Structural Assistance Facility (ESAF) from IMF and World Bank Consortium Aid, 
while in spite of frantic efforts like increase in energy charges resulting in higher 
 
5Critical value of PVDS/XGS and PVDS/GNP are 80 percent and 220 percent, respectively. 
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fuel price as compared to world prices, revenue earnings have not improved yet. 
From this we may conclude that the rescheduling of debt payments may be the 
possible resort. 
 
III.  DEBT RESCHEDULING IN PAKISTAN6 
Pakistan’s debt is rescheduled several times during seventies, eighties and 
nineties. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the rescheduling of Pakistan’s 
debt during 1971-72 to 2000-01. After the separation of East Pakistan (present 
Bangladesh), there was slow down in growth of domestic product. Investment and 
saving rate were very low. In addition, large balance of payments problem, debt and 
debt servicing aggravated the problem. Creditors agreed to reschedule debt to avoid 
loss of principal through default on one hand and subside the debt burden of the 
country on the other hand.  
There were four rescheduling in seventies and one in early eighties (see Table 
3). A moratorium on the annual debt servicing was granted to Pakistan till early 
eighties in view of the precarious balance of payments position of the country as 
well as Pakistan’s acceptance of servicing obligations of debt incurred for the benefit 
of areas in Bangladesh. In May 1972, the consortium countries provided debt relief 
of USD 233.8 million for period 1971–73 and short-term debt rescheduling 
arrangements were also made. This was followed by second short term arrangement 
for 1973-74 of USD 107.2 million. Non-consortium countries provided debt relief 
during the same period. These arrangements rescheduled about 56 percent of debt 
servicing during 1971–74. The rescheduled debt had to be repaid over period of 3 
years at interest rate not exceeding the weighted average of 5 percent.  Another 
rescheduling of USD 650 million was made for the period 1974–78. This debt relief 
arrangement expired on June 30,1978.  Pakistan had to resume full debt service 
payments despite the balance of payments difficulties, but on the request of 
Government of Pakistan, debt relief of USD 136.3 million and USD 90 million was 
given during 1978-79 to 1979-80 [Pakistan (1980-81a)]. Third request for debt 
rescheduling was accepted in 1981 and debt relief of USD 232 million was provided. 
Relief in the form of moratorium has gradually shrunk from 38 percent of annual 
maturities in 1974-75 to 12 percent in 1979-80. During 1985–88, debt of USD 11 
million was forgiven. [World Bank (1994).] Recently, debt of amount USD 3.8 
billion is rescheduled in 1999–2001. After September 11, Paris club rescheduled 
bilateral debt of USD 12.5 billion and time period is 38 years.7  It will provide a 
relief for country’s external debt problem and fiscal support for programmes other 
than debt servicing.  
 
6Pakistan (a) 1982-83.   
7The News, December 17, 2001. 
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Table 3 
Amount of Debt Rescheduling in Pakistan 
Period Amount in Million of US Dollars 
1971-73 233.766 
1973-74 107.166 
1974-78 650.0 
1977-78 226.303 
1980-82 232.0 
1985-88 11* 
1998-99 1987.63 
1999-00 1241.70 
2000-01 617.28 
December 2001 12500 
Source: GOP, State Bank and The News Dec. 17, 2001. *Debt forgiven. 
 
Moratorium provides temporary relief to country to revive the economy. 
During 1972–75 average investment rate was about 14.7 percent but this rate 
increased to 21.1 percent after first rescheduling (Table 4). Then it again fell to 18.7 
percent. During 1985–88 this ratio again increased to 19 percent. After that this ratio 
shows continuously declining trend. Growth rate of GDP shows increasing trend 
during the seventies and eighties when debt was rescheduled, but it shows declining 
trend during nineties when net transfers have been declining.   
 
Table 4 
Economic Indicators 
Year GDPg I/GDP 
1971-72 1.23 5.79 
1972-75 5.11 14.72 
1975-80 5.34 21.09 
1981-85 6.69 18.71 
1986-90 5.60 19.14 
1991-95 5.07 20.12 
1996-00 4.22 16.57 
2000-01 2.60 14.20 
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The situation is aggravated by energy crisis, increase in prices of essential 
capital and intermediate goods, decline in prices of primary export products, increase in 
world interest rate, inflation and recession in the developed market economies. The 
combination of these factors led to a general deterioration in the external payments 
position of non-oil exporting developing countries and forced many of them, including 
Pakistan, to borrow heavily or reduce their reserves. High debt servicing hampered 
Pakistan’s development efforts and led to a marked increase in the volume of internal 
and external indebtedness. Domestic financing of sovereign debt became extremely 
difficult owing also to low saving rate and low investment rate. Most recently, after 
eleven September situation has worsened i.e., inflow of Afghan refugees.  
Pakistan needs an integrated economic revival and debt reduction strategy. A 
committee was constituted to design a strategy to reduce debt burden and to suggest 
an efficient debt management system. Committee prepared a debt reduction strategy 
(see Table 5). It suggests seven strategic points to subside the debt burden and meet 
the challenge ahead. It was recognised by the committee that the external financing 
challenge requires large-scale exceptional assistance, additional debt relief from the 
IMF, World Bank, ADB, and other bilateral donors, large privatisation receipts, non-
interest current account surpluses to meet debt service payments and to increase 
foreign exchange reserves.8  The strategy will be successful only if it meet the goals 
i.e., generate a surplus in the non-interest current account of the balance of payment 
of nearly USD 1 billion annually or 1.5 percent of GDP, generate export surplus, 
normal disbursement of medium and long term loans of USD 6.2 billion will 
continue, net foreign private investment of USD 2.5 billion and assistance of USD 6 
billion from IMF, World Bank and ADB. In addition a three-year poverty reduction 
and growth facility (PRGF) is necessary to obtain USD 6 billion exceptional 
assistance. Theses are all dependent on international agencies. Despite all these 
inflows, there is a need that Government should mobilise at least USD 3 billion from 
privatisation proceeds. Trade finance should be USD 0.3 billion. In addition to all 
these efforts, there is a need for debt rescheduling from Paris club and non-
consortium debt countries of USD 5.1 billion at least.  Table shows that USD 20.6 
billion (i.e., 77 percent) of  foreign exchange inflows will be used for debt servicing, 
USD 3.8 billion (i.e., 14 percent) to increase reserves, and least possible short fall of 
USD 2.3 billion (i.e., 9 percent). This shows that debt reduction strategy concentrate 
on inflow that will result in high debt burden in future, as 77 percent of the inflow 
will result in higher debt in future. Furthermore the short fall may be higher 
depending on future political and economic situation. However, the information on 
parameter on which these projections are based are not outlined in the strategy 
paper. Thus it is difficult to determine the extent of deviations in these estimates.   
 
8Most preferable option is “debt forgiven”. 
Siddiqui and Siddiqui 696 
Table 5 
Sources and Uses of Foreign Exchange an Illustrative Scenario: 
July 2000–June 2004 (US $ Billion) 
Sources   Uses 
1. Non-Interest Current Account Surplus 3.8 
2. Normal Disbursement of Medium and 
Long Term Loans 
6.2 
3. Net Foreign Private Investment 2.5 
4. Rescheduling from Paris Club and Non 
Consortium Debt Countries 
5.1 
 
 
Debt Service 
Payments 
 
 
 
20.6 
 
5. Privatisation Proceeds 3 
6. Exceptional Quick Disbursing 
Assistance from IMF/World Bank/ 
ADB 
6 
7. Trade Finance  0.3 
8. Least Possible Short Falls  –2.3 
 
Increase Foreign 
Exchange Reserves 
 
3.8 
Total 24.4  24.4 
Source: Pakistan (2001b) “A Debt Reduction and Management Strategy”. Report of Debt Reduction and 
Management committee. Finance Division. 
 
IV.  METHODOLOGY 
We use qualitative response model to determine the probability of debt 
rescheduling for Pakistan.  The dependent variable is categorical and defined as a 
discrete, dichotomous random variable. It assumes a value of ‘1’ if debt is 
rescheduled in period t and ‘0’ otherwise.  The model specifies financial as well as 
political factors determining the probability of rescheduling. These independent 
variables may be either continuous or discrete but they are assumed to be non 
stochastic.  
Function including financial ratios and political variables, for which data are 
available, is defined as follows: 
.yt  = αo +∑ αiXit  + ∑ αjZjt  +  υt 
Where Yt is dichotomous variable 
 Yt = 1 if debt is rescheduled in given period  
  = 0 other wise   
 Xi = financial ratios where i =1,2,3,4 
 X1 = DS/ XGS  
 X2 = DS/ GNP 
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 X3 = INT/EDT 
 X4 = DS/GE 
Where  
DS = Debt Servicing,  XGS = Exports,  GNP = Gross National Product, INT = 
International Reserves, EDT  =  Total Debt, GE = Government Expenditure.   
Zj = Political variables 
  Where j =1, 2.  
   Z1 = GE/GNP 
   Z2 = DEF/GE 
 Where GE = Government Expenditure.  
 DEF = Defense Expenditure. 
  
Following, earlier empirical studies two types of factors, financial ratios and 
political factors, as explanatory variables determine the probability of rescheduling 
in the country. In the past some studies have focussed on economic indicators or 
financial ratios like debt servicing to GNP, debt servicing to exports of goods and 
services (DS/XGS), external reserves to debt out outstanding (INT/EDT).9 These 
indicators measure the burden of debt payments relative to a country’s income or 
paying capacity as well as creditworthiness of any country or region.10  First two 
ratios, X1 and X2 are expected to affect likelihood of debt rescheduling positively 
while X3 measure liquid assets and is hypothesised to be negatively associated with 
the probability of default and to probability of rescheduling.  Lastly, X4 measures the 
debt burden on government budget. 
There is much criticism on the studies, which include only financial ratios as 
determinants of rescheduling and ignores political factors. It is argued that in some 
cases economic needs motivate borrowing; while in other cases it may be political 
factors or may be both. Economic mismanagement and/ or political motivation are 
considered basic causes of current debt crisis [see for example, Eaton (1990) and 
Pakistan (2001)].  
A number of studies acknowledge the importance of political factors in 
accumulation as well as for rescheduling of debt.  Political decisions to borrow, to 
distribute resources among alternative uses and most importantly to service debt are 
as important as economic capability. The argument is summarised by Dornbusch 
(1989) as: “… domestic policies (including political decisions) were an important, 
often the main, influence in bringing about the large accumulation of debt”.  The 
studies incorporate this factor as a measure of government policy in the analysis. The 
 
9See Moghadam(1995) and Moghadam, et al. (1991). 
10See, for example, Eaton (1990); Moghadam, et al. (1991) and Moghadam (1995).   
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study by Moghadam (1995) suggests that larger the public sector relative to total 
economy, the greater the probability of default. Therefore, ratio of Government 
expenditure to GNP measuring the size of the government is also included in the 
analysis. Positive correlation is expected showing i.e., large size of government 
sector indicates high influence of political motives resulting in greater probability of 
default. In other words, the political decision of increased government role in the 
economy carries the risk of reduced perceived credit worthiness.  
The literature also suggests that in politically unstable regions government 
may acquire debt to provide national security [see Moghadam (1995)]. Indebtedness 
of any country may increase when governments borrow to purchase weapons to 
combat the internal or external security problems. Thus, defense expenditure as a 
percentage of government expenditure is used to measure instability of any 
government. This study includes both factors in econometric analysis of debt 
rescheduling in Pakistan and test the hypotheses: which factors, financial, political, 
or both are important determinants of debt rescheduling in Pakistan.  
Annual data for all variables are collected for the period 1972 to 2001 from 
different issues of Economic Survey [Pakistan (a)], Annual reports of State Bank of 
Pakistan [Pakistan (b)], and Global Development Finance [Pakistan (c)].           
 
V.  RESULTS 
Many probit model specifications are estimated but results of only three 
selected regressions are reported in Table 6.  Model 1 includes three financial ratios, 
DS/XGS, DS/GNP, INT/EDT to explain probability of debt rescheduling in 
Pakistan. Second model includes political variable GE/GNP in addition to financial 
ratios. Third model includes DS/GE instead of INT/EDT. The joint significance of 
equations is measured by chi-squared statistics and all the equations are significant at 
one percent level.   
All the three model show that financial ratios have expected sign and significant 
at 5 percent or 10 percent level.  DS/XGS measures the ability of repayment of debt 
and credit worthiness of any country.  The results show that DS/XGS has significant 
positive correlation with the probability of rescheduling in case of Pakistan. This 
finding supports the results in the previous studies i.e., as DS/XGS goes up, financial 
institutions reschedule debt to avoid total loss in case of default. 
DS/GNP measures the burden of debt payments relative to a country’s 
income. It was expected to effect probability of rescheduling positively, because as 
burden increases the probability of default increases so the lenders tend to 
reschedule the debt. The estimated coefficient of the ratio, DS/GNP, has expected 
sign and is statistically significant.  
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Table 6 
Results for Probit Function 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 32.6 
(1.81) ** 
46.22 
(1.73) ** 
94.24 
(2.11) * 
Financial Variables 
DS/XGS 0.76 
(1.81) ** 
0.80 
(1.67) ** 
1.17 
(2.05) * 
DS/GNP 7.15 
(1.93) ** 
8.0 
(1.72) ** 
21.34 
(2.14) * 
INT/EDT  –0.71 
(1.89) ** 
–1.22 
(1.81) ** 
– 
DS/GE   –7.56 
(2.04) * 
Political Factors 
GE/GNP – –1.14 
(1.59) 
–3.5 
(2.11) * 
 
Chi2 
 
2.66a 
 
25.63 a 
 
22.05a 
a Significant at 1 percent level.  *Significant at 5 percent level. ** Significant at 10 percent level. 
 
INT/EDT is a measure of liquid assets and is hypothesised to be negatively 
associated with the probability of default and negatively correlated with 
rescheduling of debt as well.  The results show that it has correct sign and is 
statistically significant at 10 percent.  This implies that the higher the INT/EDT, i.e., 
the larger is liquidity that a country possess, the lower is the probability of 
negotiation of the rescheduling of country’s debt.  
In the second model we included Political variable in addition to financial 
ratios. The results show that financial ratios still have significant impact on 
rescheduling and have expected sign but GE/GNP does not affect debt rescheduling 
significantly.  
Third model includes DS/GE instead of INT/EDT ratio in addition to other 
financial ratios. This variable has negative sign. DS/GNP and DS/XGS have 
expected signs and are statistically significant. But GE/GNP still has negative sign, 
which is not as it is found in previous studies for Latin America and Carribean.  The 
study by Moghadam (1995) shows that the probability of debt rescheduling increases 
with increase in GE/GNP for Latin America and the Caribbean but not for Africa.  In 
Latin American countries failure of the private sector enforced government to fill the 
gap for sustainable economic growth resulting in rising fiscal deficit. In case of 
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Pakistan, in 1990s, Pakistan opted for trade liberalisation and structural adjustment 
policies and reduced subsidies and started denationalisation and privatisation 
process, which is expected to stimulate growth, and reduce government intervention 
and probability of rescheduling. Furthermore, the liberalisation and structural 
adjustment programmes resulting into more resource inflow from multilateral 
sources, reducing the probability of default and consequently rescheduling. 
We find some evidence for Pakistan that diverge from the results obtained in 
earlier studies of rescheduling.11 In third model we included political variable defined 
as size of public sector relative to size of the economy, which effects probability of 
rescheduling negatively. This result is somewhat puzzling, and needs in-depth 
analysis.12  DEF/GE was not statistically significant we dropped from the equation. 
Since debt rescheduling is not done for most of the South Asian countries, no 
earlier studies provide comparable evidence. Comparison of the results of this study 
with the results of empirical studies of other regions, either for all developing 
countries or for other group of countries, i.e., Latin American or Caribbean countries 
etc., shows that the financial ratios are most important factors determining the 
likelihood of rescheduling. 
Thus, our results, like the empirical studies for other regions, show that 
financial ratios i.e., debt servicing relative to exports of goods, ratio of debt 
servicing to GNP and INT/EDT or DS/GNP are significant and robust determinants 
of rescheduling in Pakistan.  
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Pakistan’s debt is rescheduled many times during the last thirty years.  The 
study estimates several probit model specifications to assess the impact of financial 
and political indicators on likelihood of debt rescheduling in Pakistan. Paper 
concludes that financial ratios, i.e., debt servicing relative to exports, ratio of debt 
servicing to GNP and ratio of international reserves to debt are significant and robust 
determinants affecting the probability of debt rescheduling in Pakistan. This 
evidence is consistent with expectations. 
INT/EDT is significant and have negatively associated with rescheduling of 
debt like in previous studies. This implies that international reserves are important to 
meet their debt obligations. The policy emerge from the analysis is to keep the 
positive perceptions of creditor countries for debtor country’s credit worthiness, 
debtor country must maintain their assets so as to maintain adequate international 
reserves to meet the debt servicing obligations.  However, the role of government is 
 
11Moghadam (1995).  
12We intend to decompose the government expenditure and see its impact on probability of 
default in another study. 
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not unambiguous and needs in-depth analysis.  As all the findings are not consistent 
with the previous findings.  So creditor must examine country specific determinants 
of default. 
In Table 4 we have seen that after each rescheduling of debt, investment rate 
increased indicating that current debt rescheduling may help to promote growth.13 
However, expansion of industrial and agricultural output, to enable country to 
generate more revenue and exportable surplus, is needed to increase the credit 
worthiness of the country.  
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Comments 
 
Debt rescheduling belongs to the relatively unexplored aspects of debt 
management both theoretical and empirical. In case of Pakistan, the paucity of 
literatures on the subject has been critical and for that reason, the efforts of the 
authors namely Rizwana Siddiqui and Rehana Siddiqui to undertake empirical 
analysis of debt rescheduling for Pakistan must be appreciated. 
The stock of public debt in Pakistan with a substantive component of the 
external debt has assumed alarming proportions due to profligacy of the successive 
governments, whether democratically elected or militarily imposed. The stock of 
debt generates flows in the form of debt servicing, which appear as annual liabilities 
in the current budget as well as in the current account of the balance of payments. 
The haemorrhage of public sector resources on account of debt servicing has 
emerged as the principal source of fiscal deficit of the country and a major challenge 
for macroeconomic stabilisation and growth management. The authors have 
discussed in detail the debt situation in Pakistan thus justifying the choice of the 
theme for research.  
The authors have comprehensively analysed the variations in some of the 
important parameters related to debt servicing for the period 1971-72 to 2000-01. 
These parameters include Net Transfers to Gross Disbursement  (NT/GD), Debt 
Servicing to GNP (DS/GNP) and Debt Servicing to Export Earning (DS/XGS) ratios 
etc. Referring to Debt Servicing to Export Earning (DS/XGS) ratio, the authors 
claim: Most of the time the ratio shows increasing trend in period of rescheduling. 
This conclusion needs a careful scrutiny. The authors have not given any explanation 
of the inverse relationship between DS/XGS and the rescheduling of debt. If the ratio 
DS/XGS generally shows a rising trend following the debt rescheduling, it shows 
that debt rescheduling has a limited impact in reducing the burden of debt or debt 
servicing. However, a more rigorous analysis is required on this relationship. 
The theme of the paper raises a fundamental question: Is rescheduling of the 
external debt amenable to a defined and predictable behaviour? Is this behaviour 
sufficiently determinate to be captured through regression analysis based on Probit 
techniques or related econometric methods? 
The debt rescheduling experience of Pakistan during the period 1971–73 to 
2001-02 fails to indicate any systematic pattern both in terms of its timing and the 
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amounts rescheduled.  The essential feature of all rescheduling episodes for Pakistan 
relates to the discretion of lending countries and institutions rather than any rational 
justification based on specific economic criterion. 
The economic history of various developing countries clearly shows that the 
disbursement of external debts and grants by  the lending countries on bilateral and 
multilateral basis as well as the rescheduling of debt are linked with political 
motives, economic expediencies and loan-related conditionalities. The rescheduling 
of external loans is rarely determined by financial parameters such as Debt 
Servicing/Earnings, Debt Servicing/GNP, Reserves/Debts or Debt-servicing/ 
Government Expenditure ratios. 
The above conclusion can be verified by the quantum of debt rescheduling  
for Pakistan which has varied from $234 million in 1971–73 to $650 million in 
1974–78 and from $11 million in 1985–88 to $1988 million in 1998-99 and $12,500 
million in 2001-02. These rescheduling events and amounts can be linked with non-
economic considerations or major political events such as change of political regimes 
(incidently, military regimes in Pakistan have generally received above average 
external resource inflows as well as debt reliefs). Broadly speaking, the political 
agenda of lenders associated with loans and their rescheduling for recipient countries 
including Pakistan remains esoteric and economists cannot capture this agenda in 
their Probit models, however well-devised. 
To determine the probability of debt rescheduling, the authors have used the 
qualitative response models where the dependent variable is categorical and defined 
as a discrete, dichotomous random variable assuming  value of ‘1’ for period debt 
was rescheduled and ‘0’ otherwise. The authors claim that many Probit 
specifications were estimated but results of only three regression equations are 
reported in the paper. The choice of three  regression equations/models out of ‘many’ 
models exposes the limitations of the econometric methods as a tool of analysis 
whether used for qualitative or quantitative  hypothesis testing. It would have been  
interesting if some of the models which were estimated but excluded from the paper 
were also given to provide a comparative and comprehensive view of the model 
specification and the results thereof. 
The practice of reporting only the “chosen” models though not uncommon in 
econometric research, highlights the dichotomy between the theoretical  foundations 
of the models and empirical choices made by the authors to test the theory. 
Paradoxically, however, out of three reported models, the co-efficients of only one 
model i.e. Model 3 are significant at the traditional 5 percent level of significance 
while the co-efficients  of  other two models are significant only at 10 percent level. 
That  clearly shows that the basic hypotheses of the paper withstand the  common 
econometric tests only  tenuously. Furthermore the failure of the authors to report the 
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number of observations and the degrees of freedom for each equation further reduces 
the usefulness of the regression analysis to deduce plausible results about debt 
rescheduling in Pakistan. 
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